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Executive Summary 
The SME Instrument (SMEI) is a new consolidated funding scheme within Horizon 
2020. It was introduced in 2014 as a dedicated tool to support high potential innovation, 
ultimately as a way to consolidate EU policy efforts to foster European competitiveness 
in advanced technologies in order to match its excellence in science. The expectations 
were pinned on small firms – the drivers of knowledge economy. There was never 
previously a tool dedicated exclusively to supporting the technological entrepreneurship 
of small and medium-sized companies in the European policy landscape. Therefore, the 
introduction of the SME Instrument was eagerly expected and widely welcomed by both 
policymakers and European small companies.  
However, both practitioners and experts have been growing increasingly frustrated with 
the pace and the rates of implementation of the Instrument. With the extraordinary rate of 
response from European SMEs that the Instrument received, it has so far been financially 
constrained in satisfying the demand, which has eventually led to some losses of 
investment and the neglect of talent.  
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In this report, we provide the description and initial analysis of the SME Instrument, as 
well as first lessons that can be extracted from the ongoing stream of applications. We 
first note that Europe has long been experiencing a paradoxical disbalance between its 
strength in scientific research and its low capacity in innovation. We illustrate how the 
need for a dedicated tool of technological innovation support within the European policy 
landscape has been growing, becoming increasingly recognised throughout the successive 
framework programmes.   
In essence, the design of the SME Instrument mimics that of the U.S. Small Business 
Innovation Research Program in its 3-phase structure, amounts of the awards and focus 
on technology commercialisation. We analyse evaluation reports and academic literature 
of SBIR and provide initial comparison between the two programmes. What we note is 
that SBIR had multiple unexpected non-financial positive externalities, such as the 
facilitation of entrepreneurship culture, and we make multiple propositions about the 
likelihood of these effects occurring as a result of the SME Instrument funding. 
The report identifies three main policy implications based on first years of 
implementation of the SMEI: while it is extremely popular, it is way too competitive. The 
low probability of funding may discourage future applications once the hype for the new 
tool fades. Second, the variety of firms applying for the SMEI support discloses the 
variety of strategies and ways of coping with early stage lack of financing that exist in 
Europe. Many lessons can be extracted from the narratives of applicant firms and their 
business models. Third, there is still a lot of ambiguity about the 3rd phase of the SMEI 
and the ways in which SMEI awardees can access further sources of European finance.  
Finally, the report profiles the proposals in terms of their technological area, country 
where the proposals submitted from, countries with the highest rates of funded proposals, 
size and age of applicant and successful SMEs, the amount of funding allocated. 
Eventually, we open up discontinuities in funding between phase 1 and phase 2 of the 
SMEI, calling them ‘Wasted Talent’. This data can be a source for ongoing research in 
innovation management. Among others, the paper provides initial insights into how the 
SMEI awardee data can be used for the analysis of fast growing firms across sectors, how 
the applicant and awardee data can be used in the evaluation of the SMEI as a policy tool, 
a comparative dimension with the US SBIR and how it is possible to study synergies with 
other entrepreneurship policies on the European and national levels. 
 
1 Introduction 
This work provides an introduction and an overview of the SME Instrument (SMEI) – 
currently the most popular and innovative part of the EU funding landscape. To date, 
over a quarter of Horizon 2020 applications have been submitted for the SME Instrument. 
The SMEI provides financial rewards to innovative small firms that demonstrate high 
growth potential. With its scale and scope, SME Instrument is a type of action new to 
Europe and was introduced in Horizon 2020 (H2020), the Eighth European Framework 
Programme for Research and Innovation. SME Instrument was to a large extent modeled 
after one of the most successful existing programmes that support small firms: SBIR, the 
U.S. Small Business Innovation Research Program (EC, 2011).  
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Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) 1 constitute the vast majority of companies in any 
country, and are the backbone of European economy. According to the Annual Report on 
European SMEs 2014/15 (Muller et al., 2015), in 2014, SMEs represented 99.8% of 
businesses and weighed for 67% of total employment (2/3 of private sector workforce, 
about 90 mln people) in the 28 European Member States, generating 58% of gross value 
added. In the same year, SMEs created the 71.4% of new jobs in the non-financial 
business sector. 
The SME Instrument financially supports, provides coaching and network support in 
order to foster high-growth firms and commercialise highly innovative research across 
the priorities of H2020. It empowers innovative potential of participating firms and 
smoothers their transition to other the EU funding schemes. Launched in 2014, the SME 
Instrument already received more than 20,000 proposals and was able to finance 1,879 
projects, allocating almost € 700 mln. 
This paper overviews the history, design and early stages of implementation of the SME 
Instrument, as well as provides initial analyses and sketches of future research agendas. 
To do this, we collected and analysed the data on SMEs that either were awarded SMEI 
grants, or received a ‘Seal of Excellence’ from the European Commission. The aggregate 
data that we present in this study are our elaborations based on the publicly available data 
published on the website of EASME – Executive Agency of SMEs of the European 
Commission.  
The paper is structured as follows: the next section positions the SME Instrument among 
relevant academic theories, in the European landscape and among similar policies. In 
Sections 3 and 4, we provide preliminary analysis of design and implementation of SME 
Instrument, its strong points as well as some issues that emerged along the way. Section 5 
provides an agenda for future research. Section 6 concludes the paper.  
2 Positioning the SME Instrument: from Theory to Practice 
SME Instrument is an important landmark development of European policy. Analysing 
the design and implementation of the SME Instrument is of great interest to a variety of 
academic communities, as well as to policymakers and practitioners. In this section, we 
identify three research contexts for the analysis of the SME Instrument: (i) government 
support of small firms in the context of SME growth theories; (ii) EU research and 
innovation policy, with prospects of evaluation; and (iii) a comparative view of small 
business support programmes (taking the US SBIR as a benchmark). 
2.1 SME Instrument and SME Growth in Europe 
SME growth has been one of the most widely debated topics of innovation management 
                                                 
1
 The European Commission identifies SMEs companies with less than 250 employees and with no more 
than € 50 mln of annual turnover and/or an annual balance sheet not higher than € 43 mln.  
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in the past 2 decades. Accordingly, governments worldwide have re-evaluated the role of 
small firms in economic growth (Wennekers and Thurik, 1999). We identify two areas 
where the discussion of the SME Instrument can contribute to the development of theory 
of small business growth: the ‘leverage effect’ of bridging the equity gap, and the impact 
of direct public support on the growth of ‘gazelles’.  
There is currently a very positive view of the role of SMEs in economic development. 
Small firms are seen as sources of employment, innovation and local impact and 
empowerment (Acs et al., 1999; Drilhon and Estime, 1993). Yet, SMEs have constrained 
financial resources, which prompt them to keep seeking for extra capital. However, 
private investors are usually cautious and prefer to invest in companies that already 
demonstrate high growth rates instead of in newly founded firms with promising 
inventions. This part of SME growth trajectory – from the establishment to recognition 
and first major private investment – has been described by in the literature as the ‘equity 
gap’ (Hyytinen and Toivanen, 2005). As venture capital funds and other private investors 
tend to be averse to such kind of investment, public support carries small firms through 
this market failure to the point where they can be investable for private funds (Colombo 
et al., 2016a; Lim and Kim, 2015). 
Bridging the ‘equity gap’ is the reason why public investment in small business exists. 
Public investment is seen as one of the few effective tools to help young small firms to 
make the journey from the inception to attracting their first venture funding (Buckley, 
2016), not only due to direct effects of finance, but also due to the publicity effect this 
type of funding has for private venture capitalists. This “leverage effect” has been one of 
the most eagerly expected results of the SME Instrument. Evaluation of the SMEI 
awardees’ performance will necessarily need to trace whether or not they manage to 
attract private equity after the SMEI award and the share of this equity in contrast with 
the award itself. The combination of these various funding sources and the impact of 
timing of the investment are debated (Alperovych et al., 2015; David et al., 2000; Grilli 
and Murtinu, 2015) and could be probed further using SMEI award data. 
The leverage effect exists alongside other entrepreneurship and small business support 
initiatives (Shapira, 2010). Credit guarantees so far remain the most widely employed 
type of support tool in OECD countries (OECD, 2016). In terms of innovation policies 
and programmes, research so far has mostly focused on the effects of fiscal incentives for 
small firms, subsidies, and government venture funding (Brander et al., 2015; Czarnitzki 
et al., 2011; Guo et al., 2016).  
SME Instrument is a subsidy-type public investment: the awardees have no obligation to 
repay the investment they receive from the EU. This type of public support is usually 
more selective than credit guarantees or fiscal incentives, as the public body handpicks 
the successful companies. Yet, the companies usually receive sums that are larger per 
company than the ones awarded by any other public SME finance tools. A subsidy 
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instrument can also serve in addition to other measures: the same innovative SME can get 
both tax credits and subsidies. Studies provide a mixed response when they evaluate such 
instruments. The main criticism is that public subsidies generally cannot aid all 
companies that deserve it (Becchetti and Trovato, 2002). The latter is particularly 
relevant in relation to the SME Instrument, considering its low application success rates.  
Subsidy-type instruments tend to target high-growth innovative SMEs in science- and 
technology-intensive sectors, or support entrepreneurship in the innovation ecosystem, 
such as academic entrepreneurship (Bertoni and Tykvova, 2015; Bronzini and Piselli, 
2016; Hottenrott and Lopes-Bento, 2014; Zúñiga-Vicente et al., 2014). In these cases, the 
instruments were generally found to be effective in helping the companies bridge the 
equity gap and continue growing.  
However, no particular effect has so far been identified in relation to all fast growing 
companies. These companies – ‘gazelles’ – are found to constitute a small minority of 
SMEs, but give big promise in terms of innovation, job creation and overall impact 
(Birch et al., 1998; Feindta et al., 2002; Skuras et al., 2005; Wong et al., 2005). Gazelles 
are found in all sectors of the economy and across all technologies. By identifying 
European gazelles and making them visible, the H2020 policymakers aim to provide a 
subsequent investment pipeline for these valuable firms.  
Studies stress certain sets of characteristics of gazelles, which distinguishes them from 
low-growth companies, such as location and technology environment, experienced 
founders, creative business practices and careful human resource management (Barringer 
et al., 2005). Financing conditions and opportunities were found to be especially 
important for gazelles (Mason and Brown, 2013), yet no direct links have so far been 
established between government subsidies and the propensity of subsequent high growth 
(Koski and Pajarinen, 2013).  
The question remains open whether the SME Instrument provides the best type of support 
to the prospective European SME champions. The visibility boost and the financial 
support that young firms receive from the award have not yet been studied in detail. On 
the contrary, enacting a more targeted SME support mechanism (for example, supporting 
only academic entrepreneurship) with broader coverage (such as innovation vouchers) 
could be more effective than funding a very small number of firms. Therefore, the exact 
link between the funding the SME Instrument provides and its impact on SME growth in 
the European context is yet to be established.   
2.2 SME Instrument in the Context of European Policy 
SME Instrument is the latest attempt to provide a solution to the EU’s underperformance 
in terms of exploitation of new technologies. Compared with Europe’s strength in 
producing new research, this discrepancy has been named a ‘European Paradox’ 
(Lundvall and Borràs, 2005). This issue was not paid much attention to in the first four 
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iterations, EU Framework Programmes, which tended to focus on strengthening the 
science base. Yet, when the innovation caveat was thought to undermine the eventual 
economic gain (Barker and Cameron, 2004), increasingly more changes were made to 
address it, starting from FP5 onwards. However, while SME and entrepreneurship 
policies improved significantly, up until the launch of Horizon 2020, there was not one 
funding stream to which European SMEs could apply for support alone and not as a part 
of consortia.  
At the time of writing, the H2020 mid-term assessment is due to start in late 2016. The 
evaluation will focus on the effectiveness of the program, the relevance of the measures it 
includes and their coherence, the efficiency and use of resources, and the EU added value 
of the actions (EC, 2016a). In this context, we analyse how H2020, with its innovation 
entrepreneurship agenda, fared against its predecessors. We first overview how European 
entrepreneurship policies developed throughout framework programmes. We then outline 
the contemporary EU funding landscape and opportunities it gives to the SMEs. Finally, 
we present some considerations on SME Instrument evaluation.  
2.2.1 R&I in the European Union: from the Framework Programmes to Horizon 2020 
Since the inception of its first structured policy for science and technology in the early 
1980s, Europe has fared remarkably in the development of a unified research and 
innovation landscape across its member states. Over the past 40 years, EU Strategic and 
Framework Programmes assisted to the reduction of research and innovation divide 
across European countries and regions (Barker and Cameron, 2004), and in boosting 
Europe’s competitiveness against global leaders in science, mainly, the USA and Japan 
(Colombo et al., 2016b; Young, 2015).  
EU programmes for science and technology were initially research-driven. Innovation 
and commercialisation aspects were introduced gradually as the ‘European Paradox’ 
caveat became apparent to policy makers. We identify four periods in the development of 
EU research and innovation programmes: experimentation, consolidation, innovation 
shift, and integration.  
The experimentation period covers the first attempts to develop truly European research 
agenda. It includes the launch of the European Strategic Programme for Research and 
Development in Information Technology in 1982 and collecting all ongoing programmes 
under the single umbrella of the First Framework Programme (FP1, 1984-1987). These 
two initiatives focused on few research areas (such as industrial, information and 
biotechnologies), identified strategic European priorities, and developed a system 
whereby funds were allocated based on submitted proposals (Roediger-Schluga and 
Barber, 2006). However, these initial attempts faced significant burdens, such as delays, 
abandons, and the stonewalling attitude of some Member States (Guzzetti, 1995).  
The FP1 provided a set of projects for technological innovation that included European 
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companies, in order to involve them in sharing their costs. The programme also supported 
industrial collaboration and facilitated academia-government-industry links. Some 
changes made during the FP1 indicate the rising importance of industrial participation 
throughout the programme: for example, the budget allocated on energy research 
decreased, with a symmetrical increase of budget dedicated to the research for industrial 
competitiveness.  
The consolidation period spans the Second and the Third Framework Programmes (FP2, 
1988-1991 and FP3, 1990-1994) and witnesses the emergence of the scope, duration and 
structure of FPs, which has been carried over to the present day. The legal basis of the 
FPs was established in the Single European Act (1987) and the Maastricht Treaty (1992). 
EU Framework Programmes formalised the technology push approach as a driver of 
European knowledge-based economy, were to last for 5 years, and encompassed projects 
related to basic and applied research, technology development and demonstration. 
The role of industrial collaboration was also envisioned to become more active in FP3 
and FP4. In fact, FP3 was the first program to include SMEs among its targets through 
the Co-operative research programme (Roediger-Schluga and Barber, 2006). The FP4, in 
its turn, promoted international collaboration and integration, along with the diffusion of 
new technologies, allocating budget on researchers’ mobility and training-related 
measures.  
A milestone in this development was the Green Paper on Innovation (EC, 1995), 
published between the third and the fourth Framework Programmes. The Green Paper 
stipulated that the EU at that point was not investing enough in innovation, both in terms 
of human resources and funds, especially if compared with global competitors. EU 
member states not only showed huge differences in their regulations and bureaucracy, but 
also high cultural and linguistic barriers. Furthermore, the EU lacked coordination and 
concentrated efforts to reduce challenges and restrictions to innovation. 
The Green Paper had great impact on how Framework Programmes were since then 
perceived, and prompted an innovation shift in European funding. Exploitation of 
research results, in order to transform them into real innovations, became one of the key 
priorities, and, starting from FP4 (1995-1998), the budgets allocated to managing 
innovative outputs significantly increased.  
In terms of the overall budget allocation, the increase was also significant. From an 
average of € 5.25 bln for the first three FPs, the budget grew to € 13.215 bln in the FP4. 
The FP5 (1998-2002) had a budget of € 14.96 bln, with a strong user-oriented approach 
and a goal to tackle socio-economic challenges through the development of breakthrough 
innovations. The budget of FP7 was 219% of FP6 budget, which is the highest hike in FP 
budget allocation so far (see Figure 1).  
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Figure 1 European Framework Programmes Budgets 
Source: European Commission 
Nonetheless, the assessment of the FP5 brought forth concerns about the impact of EU 
research and innovation policy on European competitiveness and economic growth. The 
stress was placed on the lack of interaction – be it between research disciplines, or 
innovation actors (Bruce et al., 2004). In response, the European Commission shifted its 
focus towards the development of opportunities of broader communication and 
interactions among actors involved in research and innovation. The three latest 
Framework Programmes have strived to integrate European resources, to develop 
complementarities and synergies between initiatives, and to provide incentives for 
participating actors’ interaction. 
In research, the FP6 (2002-2006) was designed with a purpose to contribute to the 
development of the European research Area (ERA), which systematised previously 
fragmented European scientific resources (European Commission, 2000). Strengthening 
the ERA was also included in the goals of the FP7. The EC substantially increased the 
budget of the FP7 (2007-2013), allocating more than € 55 bln to improve European 
research excellence and build a knowledge economy, supporting basic research and 
improving transnational collaboration to boost EU competitiveness, growth and 
employment. 
In innovation, the SMEs became crucial: looking at the role played by the US small 
business in the rise of the Silicon Valley industries, the EC started pursuing scale 
economies and the diffusion of technologies through the collaboration among SMEs, and 
between SMEs and other actors of the innovation system (Barker and Cameron, 2004). 
Furthermore, FP7 recognised the crucial role of SMEs in European economic recovery, 
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and promoted strategic involvement of small firms in European funding landscape, 
allocating the total of 16.9% of the budget to support them.  
The increase in FP7 funding was a trustable opportunity that EU never had before. 
Universities, research organisations, private companies and public organisations (though 
in lower numbers) participated in the FP7, submitting more than 139,000 research 
proposals. SMEs were heavily involved in these partnership projects. About 19,300 
SMEs participated in the 106,000 projects registered to the FP7, receiving almost €5 bln 
of EU contribution (Fresco et al., 2015). FP7 also successfully stimulated public-private 
partnerships in research initiatives, promoting cross-border and cross-sector cooperation.  
2.2.2 Horizon 2020: a change of pace in the FPs 
Horizon 2020 (2014-2020), the Eighth Framework Programme, continues with the effort 
of integrating European resources and capabilities to assist research and innovation 
efforts. However, it changes pace from 5 to 7 years, it is broader, and it demonstrates 
much higher embeddedness with other projects that constitute EU innovation strategy.  
First, H2020 is designed to propel Europe to achieve its 2020 goals as defined in the 
Innovation Union. In 2010, the European Commission launched Europe 2020 (European 
Commission, 2010), a ten-year jobs and growth strategy aimed at creating appropriate 
conditions towards smart, sustainable and inclusive growth. These priorities are tackled 
through seven flagship initiatives, one of which is the Innovation Union (see Table 1).  
Table 1 Flagship Initiatives of Europe 2020 
Smart Growth 
Digital Agenda for Europe 
Innovation Union 
Youth on the move 
Sustainable Growth 
Resource efficient Europe 
An industrial policy for the globalisation era 
Inclusive Growth 
An agenda for new skills and jobs 
European platform against poverty 
Source: European Commission 
The Innovation Union includes over thirty action points aiming at (re)making Europe a 
world-class science performer, removing the obstacles to innovation that prevent ideas 
going quickly to market, and changing the modes through which the public and private 
sector cooperate. H2020 represents the financial tool for implementing the Innovation 
Union, the engine propelling Europe toward 2020 goals. Overall, it allocates nearly € 80 
bln of funding (€ 70.2 bln in constant prices).  
At the same time, according with the priorities of ERA, H2020 continues to structure the 
research environment to foster the creation of knowledge that is necessary to promote 
innovation. H2020 is strictly interrelated with the implementation of the ERA and 
11 
 
incorporates diversified policy tools2. In this sense, H2020 is much broader in terms of its 
scope than FP7. In addition to the initiatives prioritised in FP7, it includes some funding 
mechanisms that previously were a part of the Competitiveness and Innovation 
Programme, and some initiatives promoted by the European Institute for Innovation and 
Technology.  
Furthermore, H2020 is characterised by a strong connection with European Structural 
Funds, which now consider research and innovation as their key priority. Most recent 
legislation provides for the combination of EU-level financial instruments, such as 
H2020, and European Structural and Investment Funds (ESIF) allocated in joint 
instruments and pursuing the same policy goals, implementing the same requirements and 
delivery mechanisms, even though the instruments differ on eligibility criteria and final 
beneficiaries. 
H2020 is the world largest cross-border research programme. It couples research and 
innovation with three mutually reinforcing and complementary priorities: Excellent 
Science, Industrial Leadership, and Societal Challenges (see Table 3). It integrates and 
simplifies the support throughout the innovation cycle by focusing on innovation and 
providing ongoing R&D support. The stimulation of innovation in small and medium-
sized European firms becomes one of its key targets.  
H2020 adopts a bottom-up challenge-based approach. While H2020 has certain 
technological areas of special interest, the Programme leaves industry applicants 
considerably free to propose innovative solutions, while the emphasis is on the expected 
impact of innovative solutions proposed. Proposals submitted to H2020 funding projects 
ideally relate to one of the goals of the ‘Societal Challenges’ Pillar, and correspond to the 
ongoing renewing agenda of two-year work programmes. The work programmes are 
based on strategic planning jointly conducted by EC and Member States representatives 
in multiple thematic committees, with the purpose to maximise the impact of European 
funding and provide more integrated approach to the programme.  
Horizon 2020 provides support to activities that are closer to users and markets (i.e. 
piloting, demonstration, prototyping) than previous FPs, and for demand side activities, 
which highly involve industry through the deployment of key enabling technologies and 
PPPs (both institutional and contractual). 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
2 E.g. the Societal Challenges, the European Research Council, the European Institute of Technology, 
ERA-NETS, the Marie Curie actions, etc. 
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Table 2 Key Pillars of Horizon 2020 
Source: European Commission 
2.2.3 SME Support in H2020 
On the European level, first policies related to providing small firms with financial 
guarantees that increase their lending and leasing were launched in 1998. They focused 
on supporting highly innovative and fast-growing SMEs. Almost 600,000 SMEs received 
guarantees support from the EU up to date, and more than € 4 bln was invested so far 
through equity instruments, Structural Funds and other financial instruments. Among 
these are the Competitiveness and Innovation Framework Programme; the European 
Progress Microfinance Facility; and, during 2007-2013, Risk Sharing instrument for 
Innovative Research oriented SMEs & Small Mid-Caps.  
With regard to Framework Programmes, the involvement of the SMEs has been 
increasing since the FP1. However, some scholars and practitioners still considered their 
participation in the FP7 as not satisfactory (Colombo et al., 2016b). SME projects need 
short-term commercial return and that jeopardised their participation in European projects 
that require heavy commitment of funding and time resources (Luukkonen, 1998; 
Luukkonen and Hälikkä, 2000). However, SMEs participating in EU consortia show 
strong market-oriented purposes and propensity to collaborate, even more than large 
companies, interest in R&D funds and potential new markets (Luukkonen, 2002). The 
benefits of SME participation in FPs and the need for ‘special treatment’ of SME needs 
necessitated positioning SMEs as specific targets of FPs, staring from FP3.  
The economic crises and the rise of new actors in the globalised economy created new 
Excellent Science
• European Research Council
• Future and Emerging Technologies
• Marie Skłodowska-Curie actions
• Research Infrastructures, including
e-Infrastructures
Industrial Leadership
• Leadership in Enabling and
Industrial Technologies (LEIT)
• Access to risk finance
• Innovation in SMEs
Societal Challenges
• Health, Demographic Change and
Wellbeing
• Food Security, Sustainable
Agriculture and Forestry, Marine,
Maritime and Inland Water
Research and the Bioeconomy
• Secure, Clean and Efficient Energy
• Smart, Green and Integrated
Transport
• Climate Action, Environment,
Resource Efficiency and Raw
Materials
• Europe in a changing world -
Inclusive, innovative and reflective
societies
• Secure societies – Protecting
freedom and security of Europe
and its citizens
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challenges for EU performance on the global market. In order to face these challenges, 
the European Commission decided to strongly invest in the R&D activities conducted by 
European SMEs considering them essential actors in implementing innovation strategies, 
restoring EU competitiveness and creating new job and growth opportunities (Di Minin 
& De Marco, in press; Fresco et al., 2015). 
H2020 extends the support of small and medium-sized firms in comparison with the 
previous FPs3, both in terms of budget and diversification of support tools. The centrality 
of the SMEs in H2020 can in fact be considered its main distinguishing feature. In 
December 2013, the European Commission established the Executive Agency for Small 
and Medium-Sized Enterprises (EASME) to provide wide support for SMEs participating 
in H2020 programmes, from networking and matching them with partners, to help with 
intellectual property management (EASME, 2016). 
H2020 adopts an integrated approach towards SME support. The programme allocates, 
overall, over € 17 bln for the SMEs. 80% of this budget (€ 13.56 mln) is allocated 
through the Leadership Enabling Industrial Technologies (LEIT) Programme; 17% (€ 
2.84 mln) is allocated through the Access to risk finance scheme; and the remaining 3% 
(€ 616 mln) is allocated through the funding scheme Innovation in SMEs. Furthermore, 
the 20% of the budget of LEITs and Societal Challenges is reserved to SMEs: 13% for 
collaborative projects and 7% for the SME Instrument managed by EASME. The 
following paragraph will overview the SME Instrument and the next section will discuss 
its initial results.  
2.2.4 The SME Instrument 
The SME Instrument is dedicated to support highly innovative SMEs oriented toward 
internationalisation and growth, committed to implement high-risk ideas with highly 
innovative potential. The SME Instrument provides support to projects with European 
relevance, potentially able to introduce disruptive innovations and change the business 
world. It provides funds to bridge the early-stage ‘equity gap’ and aims to identify the 
next generation of European business champions (see Section 2.1). It also aims at 
boosting SMEs’ potential of expanding their activities and markets in Europe and beyond 
the EU. 
SMEI integrates all the previous programmes and initiative for SMEs in a single funding 
scheme. It incorporates old support programmes overseen by the FP7 and the 
Competitiveness and Innovation Framework Programme. A key difference is that in all 
prior SME support policies, SMEs could only enter competitions in partnerships with 
other private or public sector organisations. Within SME Instrument, an SME can 
                                                 
3 Due to volume limitations, we limit the focus of this paper to the description of the SME Instrument, 
being fully aware that the European scenario of support for small and medium-sized business goes far 
beyond the SMEI and includes many programmes managed both within and outside the H2020 framework, 
such as COSME, Eureka-Eurostar scheme and others.  
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participate in a European call alone. Yet, partnering is advisable to increase the chances 
of success, especially with universities and other research-performing organisations.  
The SMEI is structured in three main phases (with addition of the coaching tool), 
articulated as follows: concept and feasibility assessment; demonstration and market 
replication R&D; Commercialisation. The emphasis of the SMEI is on speeding up the 
innovation process, for fast assessment and application of innovation.  
The SMEI is an open call, meaning that companies can apply whenever they prefer and 
be included in the quarterly rankings awarding the funds. Each phase specifies fundable 
activities for winning proposals. Depending on the stage of development of the project to 
be proposed, SMEs can apply directly to the second phase of funding if they want to 
bypass the first one.  
We review each of the phases in detail below. 
1- Concept and Feasibility assessment. In Phase 1 (Ph1) the SMEs are called to 
transform a business idea into a business concept by developing the idea and 
evaluating its viability, considering technological and commercial risks, and the 
potential of the idea, its feasibility. In a preliminary business plan, the proposing 
companies explore possibilities of commercialising a breakthrough innovation. 
SMEs apply to Ph1 with a short business plan (about 10 pages long). They 
describe the innovativeness and excellence of their business idea, its potential 
impact and the proposed implementation strategy. 10% of the total SMEI budget 
is allocated in this phase, and each winning project is awarded with a lump sum of 
€ 50,000. Funds are employed for a proof of concept, technical feasibility 
assessment and commercial potential assessment of an innovation that the SME 
wants to develop and bring to the market. Fundable activities include risk 
assessment, market analysis and design, exploring intellectual property (IP) 
regimes and strategies, developing pilot applications. The project should aim at 
bringing a new service, product or process to the market, through innovative 
application of technologies, methodologies or extant business processes. The 
project is supposed to align with the business strategy of the SME, as a tool to 
pursue internal growth or aiming at new transnational business opportunities. Ph1 
covers a maximum of 6 months per project and its main output is a feasibility 
study including an elaborated business plan. 
2- Demonstration and Market Replication R&D. Phase 2 (Ph2) includes 
activities, such as R&D, demonstration and replication on the market. By going 
through these steps, companies develop a business concept up to the market-
maturity and make it ready to attract further investment. The SMEs apply with a 
30-page proposal that should include a business plan and a description of 
proposed activities. Almost 88% of the SMEI budget is allocated in this phase, 
and funds are employed for innovative projects with strong strategic business 
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plans. Since companies have to demonstrate commercial potential of their 
concepts, fundable activities include prototyping (on small or large scale), testing, 
design, performance evaluation, monitoring, demonstration, piloting, validation 
for market duplication, scaling-up and application development. The amount of 
the award ranges between a minimum of € 500,000 and a maximum of € 2.5 mln 
(up to € 5 mln for healthcare projects4), and can cover up to 70% of eligible costs 
(up to 100% in healthcare projects). Ph2 projects last between 12 months and 2 
years, but in case of fully justified situations, a longer duration of the project 
activities and additional funding can be claimed. The result of Ph2 is a product, a 
process or a service that is ready to compete on the market. Awardees are also 
required to prepare an elaborated “investor-ready business plan”, which includes 
detailed commercialisation strategy, and a funding plan for the potential launch on 
the market.  
3- Commercialisation. Phase 3 (Ph3) promotes the SMEI as a quality label for 
successful projects easing the shift of innovation from market-mature status to the 
market launch. There are no direct funds awarded for this phase and only 2% of 
the budget is allocated to run it. In Ph3 the European Commission provides 
support in the commercial exploitation of innovations resulting from Phases 1 and 
2 of the SMEI, eases access to private finance, and leverages potential synergies 
with other European tools. The support can include the creation of linkages 
among private investors and clients, brokerage activities, support in the access to 
risk finance trough other European programmes, and other activities aimed at 
making SMEI projects ready to receive and/or attract investments. The launch of 
Ph3 is expected in 2016, but did not start at the point of writing. 
During Phases 1 and 2, the SMEI also provides coaching support along with the financial 
subsidies. The coaches are international business experts selected from a Community 
created under the auspices of the same H2020, which funded the CoachCom2020 project5 
to develop a coaching methodology and build a community of coaches registered on a 
European database. Under the SMEI, the coaches offer their experience to the awardees 
in 3 coaching days during Ph1 and 12 coaching days in Ph2. During these days, senior 
managers of SMEs work hand in hand with coaches to develop strategies that would 
stimulate performance of their companies. The coaches aim to enhance commercial 
potential of companies and the impact of their participation in the SMEI. Ultimately, this 
is to make the H2020 contribution a milestone of a sustainable high growth of the 
company. 
2.2.5 Award Criteria and Procedures 
Proposals submitted to the SME Instrument are screened against three defined criteria 
                                                 
4 The Societal Challenge “Clinical validation of biomarker and/or diagnostic medical devices”. 
5 cordis.europa.eu/project/rcn/193334_it.html 
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that recur in all the calls of H2020. These criteria are excellence, impact, and quality and 
efficiency of implementation. 
Excellence refers to robustness of the proposed concept against the topics included in the 
related work programmes. Successful projects need to be sound and rational, ambitious 
and with strong potential of innovativeness that overcomes the state of the art with new 
concepts and approaches.  
Impact criteria concern the extent to which the project can have valuable outputs for the 
European and/or international level. The impact is evaluated according to the innovative 
capacity of the project and the integration of new knowledge fostering companies’ 
growth. Furthermore, dissemination and exploitation of project results, including 
communication and IPR management, are among the criteria. 
Quality and efficiency of the implementation criteria concern the coherence and 
effectiveness of the work plans. They consider such aspects, as adequate allocation of 
resources for the tasks included in the milestones of projects, and the relevance of project 
participants.  
At least, four independent and highly skilled experts with experience and knowledge in 
the areas of the topics of the SMEI, including project management, innovation, 
exploitation, dissemination and communication, evaluate the submitted projects. The 
experts come from both technical and financial backgrounds and are selected with the 
aim of achieving a balanced composition in terms of skills, experience, knowledge, 
geographical diversity and gender. The experts evaluate proposals by preparing 
‘individual evaluation reports’ in which they provide comments and scores from 0 to 5 
for each of the three criteria.  
In Phase 1, the threshold to achieve per criterion is 4 points and, applying the sum of 
these points, the overall threshold is 13 points. In Phase 2, the threshold is 4 points only 
for the Impact criterion, and 3 points for the other two criteria, and the overall threshold 
is 12 points. In both Phase 1 and 2, the Impact criterion has a weight of 1.5 in 
determining the outcome. The final score is calculated based on the median of scores 
provided by the individual experts. This evaluation identifies projects below quality 
thresholds that are not mature enough to be funded, and projects above thresholds, which 
deserve funding. Depending on the availability of the budget allocated for each call, only 
the best ranking proposals receive the EU contribution. 
What distinguishes the SME Instrument is that it is not a zero sum game for participating 
SMEs: submitting a proposal but not winning the funds does not result in net loss. 
Projects that achieve scores above the thresholds but do not get funded are not discarded. 
In 2015, the European Commission launched the ‘Seal of Excellence’ scheme in order to 
allow the recognition of promising projects. The scheme was launched as a pilot only for 
the proposals applying to the SME Instrument and is under consideration to be extended 
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to other H2020 programmes in the future.  
The Seal is awarded to project proposals that were submitted to the SMEI, scored 
sufficiently to be funded, but were not funded due to budget constraints. As a quality 
label, the Seal holder firms will be able to apply to other H2020, European and National 
funds to obtain funding without having to undergo other rounds of competition. The 
initiative is designed to facilitate synergies between European and national funds, private 
or public, and to empower companies with highly innovative projects.  
Local authorities that decide to award projects coming from SME Seal of Excellence 
companies established in their territories can avoid high costs of holding public 
competitions and evaluations. Being a ‘sealed’ company means that the quality of its 
project is guaranteed on the European level and no further proving is needed, 
guaranteeing the quality of the assessment procedures.  
2.2.6 SMEI Evaluation 
SME Instrument is a young policy without a considerable results portfolio. This makes 
full evaluation of SMEI a premature task at the time of writing. However, it is already 
possible to assess some of the emerging benefits and caveats of this tool.  
The key question in policy evaluation is whether the policy is a good intervention (Edler 
et al., 2012). In the case of the SME Instrument, the policy not only aims to address the 
‘equity gap’, but also has the ambition to select and ‘highlight’ European fast-growing 
firms, and to ensure synergies with other policies at multiple levels of governance.  
The demonstrable interest from small European firms in SMEI gives encouraging signals. 
The evaluation of this newly launched and experimental tool with the purpose of its 
inclusion (in a modified form) in the next Framework Programme can take up multiple 
directions in the evaluative cycle (Vega and Chiasson, 2015). In this section, we focus on 
four of them: the policy theory (design); the way it achieves its main goals and provides 
additionality; its externalities, and its efficiency.  
The policy theory justifies the way a policy is formulated, the amount of funding 
allocated for the support, the types of support the policy provides, and the overall design 
of the policy. Part of evaluation is to understand whether the policy as it exists now fits in 
with other support measures, and how its design could be improved in the next iterations. 
With regard of the SMEI, the design of the policy is likely to be improved. As of now, 
the SMEI goals are extremely broad (to fund high potential innovation), and therefore the 
modest amount of funding is thinly spread across countries and sectors. Furthermore, in 
Section 4 of the current paper, we suggest that due to this, the issue of ‘neglected talent’ 
emerges, and the available resources could be distributed in a more flexible way. Finally, 
we note that the feedback provided to applicants is concise and does not contain the 
necessary information of how to improve their subsequent applications for next rounds of 
European funding calls.  
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The extent to which the SMEI achieves its goals should be the main item of evaluation. 
Funding high potential innovation can take two forms: to enhance participating 
companies’ innovation capabilities – and thus it will assess innovation inputs of 
awardees: R&D spending, patent applications, overall company strategy and 
technological trajectory. The other evaluation avenue is the assessment of innovation 
outputs – in terms of company survival and growth rates, sales and employment, 
delivering new innovative products, services or processes. From the analysis of policy 
documents, briefings and articles in press, we identify three more important expected 
outcomes of the SMEI: ‘leverage effect’, EU Policy Integration and achieving multi-level 
complementarities (Figure 2).  
Figure 2 SME Instrument Evaluation Framework 
 
Source: authors’ interpretation of Vega and Chiasson (2015); Gok and Edler (2012); Lanahan (2016); 
Edwards et al. (2007) 
The “leverage effect” was extensively discussed earlier in this paper. It reflects the 
expectation of the European Commission that the dedicated SMEI funding will only be a 
first step in the financing pipeline that will help European innovative SMEs develop and 
produce excellent outputs. Accessing private venture capital, as a result of the EU support 
is the main indicator of the achieving this goal.  
The financing pipeline does not only cover access to private capital, but also different 
types of access to ongoing funds. It is expected that SMEI awardees will continue to 
receive some kind of support from Europe and their national governments post-award. 
SMEI in this sense is a part of a ‘policy mix’, where the emphasis is placed on 
communication and interactions of different policies across various dimensions (Flanagan 
et al., 2011).  
Horizontally, the European Commission places high importance on synergies and 
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complementarities between H2020 programmes and the activities of European Structural 
and Investment Funds, as well as other EU programmes (European Commission, 2016b, 
2014a). Vertically, the Seal of Excellence Initiative was designed to streamline the 
process by which the Member States select and award SMEs nationally. We may even 
expect the emergence of direct complementarities between the European and national 
support tools (see Lanahan, 2016 for the US experience). Yet, the analysis of these multi-
level funding systems may uncover unexpected hurdles of which policy makers should be 
aware.  
Evaluation of SMEI goals has significant methodological implications. Studies note that 
the impact of policy is very hard to identify, mainly due to the issue of its additionality. 
Additionality is defined as the ‘added effect’ of policy, which would not have occurred in 
the absence of policy intervention (Georghiou, 2002; Gök and Edler, 2012). In terms of 
SME support, additionality is assessed in terms of whether companies would have failed 
without the support, whether the beneficial effect of the policy is additional (not 
substitutive or overlapping) to other support these companies may be getting, and 
whether the policy effects are captured by the measurements (Edwards et al., 2007; Tsai 
and Kuo, 2011). In the case of the SME Instrument, the evaluation task is to determine 
whether the success of awardees is independent from SMEI award or not.  
As a way of positive externalities, SME Instrument is expected to produce a change in 
Europe’s entrepreneurial culture, as one of the ways to overcome the ‘European 
Paradox’. The externalities will reflect culture change, in terms of orientations of SMEI 
awardees, as well as in attracting new applicants to the Instrument funding. Another part 
of culture change can be an orientation towards riskier, more unconventional innovation 
strategy by awardee firms.  
Additionally, we expect the SME Instrument to have diverging impact in various EU 
regions. As demonstrated in Section 3 of this work, SMEI awards tend to be distributed 
disproportionately among EU member countries and technology areas. A more detailed 
analysis should reveal regional clusters that tend to receive the awards. The subsequent 
research should trace academic research concentration in these areas, the availability of 
private venture capital and the overall productivity of regional clusters in which SMEI 
awardees are located.  
Finally, the efficiency of the policy needs to be estimated. Policy efficiency in evaluation 
research suggests a purely financial cost-benefit analysis, looking to answer the question 
of whether there are alternative options that would work better. SME Instrument 
definitely requires such an assessment. In a recent grey paper, Simonelli (2016) makes an 
estimation that in terms of the overall SME support, H2020 sets the target of providing 
only €1 bln funding to SMEs more than the FP7, thus calling to temper the enthusiasm 
for the SME Instrument. Indeed, form of support that the H2020 provides is more focused 
than the FP7, but does it make this tool more efficient? 
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2.3 SME Instrument and SBIR: Transatlantic Cousins 
Comparative analysis of policies that target similar market failures and have similar 
structure is useful for understanding moderating factors of design and implementation. In 
the following paragraphs, we overview the U.S. Small Business Innovation Research 
(SBIR) program, after which the SME Instrument was modeled. After that, we provide 
the initial comparison of SBIR and SMEI design.  
2.3.1 Introducing SBIR 
Established in 1982, SBIR has been regarded as one of the most successful public SME 
support tools (Audretsch, 2003; Audretsch et al., 2002a, 2002b; Cooper, 2003; Lerner, 
1999).  Reports that studied SBIR indicate that when a company receives SBIR funding, 
it significantly increases the chances of its commercial success, both in terms of 
innovative product sales, and in terms of employment. Additionally, SBIR funding has 
positive non-financial impact on awardee companies, the states they are located in, and 
on research-performing organisations. For example, Audretsch et al. (2002b) find that 
SBIR funding incentivises scientists and engineers to become entrepreneurs, to change 
their career paths and implement projects they would otherwise had not considered doing.  
Table 4 juxtaposes the main elements of design of SBIR and SME Instrument, listing 
similarities as well as differences. SMEI is similar to SBIR in its 3-phase structure, the 
purpose and the amounts of the awards, and in its general purpose. The awards of each of 
the phases of the two policy tools are comparable, but the SMEI is a much smaller 
programme overall. Its funds are allocated as a fixed amount within the H2020 budget, 
while the SBIR programme is a long-running success, and its budget is defined as a share 
of R&D budgets of 11 Federal Agencies. These Agencies tend to define the scope of the 
projects they are interested in, and indicate specific topics and calls for applications 
(Cooper, 2003). The Department of Defense is to date the biggest funder of the SBIR 
programme, with the total allocation of $1.07 bln in 2015 (SBIR.gov, 2016a), which 
matches the total allocation for the SME Instrument for the same year.  
Since its establishment, SBIR was reworked multiple times, and has expanded 
significantly. For example, in the 1992 redesign, commercialisation was moved up in the 
list of its strategic priorities. In 2012, SMEs were allowed to apply for Phase 2 funding 
without having previously applied to Phase 1 funding. In 1992, a related program Small 
Business Technology Transfer (STTR) was opened to expand joint research opportunities 
between SMEs and research-performing organisations6. Applications to these programme 
are only accepted by 5 Federal Agencies and require formal collaboration between an 
SME and a non-profit organisation (usually a university) to be eligible (SBIR.gov, 
2016b).  
                                                 
6 While STTR is a relevant tool, we limit its description in this paper, as the focus is on SBIR and SMEI.  
21 
 
Table 3 SBIR and the SME Instrument Compared 
 
SBIR SME Instrument 
Purpose 
Clearly Listed Targets: 
 Technological innovation;  
 Meeting Federal R&D needs;  
 Increase of private-public 
commercialisation and innovation; 
 Encouraging diversity of 
entrepreneurship. 
Funds high-potential innovation. 
Expected impact:  
 Enhance profitability and growth 
of SMEs;  
 Market uptake by addressing 
specific challenges;  
 Increase of private investment in 
innovations. 
Recipients 
SMEs only (up to 1/3 of research can 
be subcontracted) 
SMEs (alone or with partners) 
Design 
3-phase (from Concept to 
Commercialisation) 
3-phase (from Concept to 
Commercialisation) 
Award Amount 
$150.000 in Phase 1; up to $1 mln in 
Phase 2 
€ 50.000 in Phase 1; up to EUR 2.5 
mln in Phase 2 
Total Funding 
Amount 
$1.5 bln in 2015 € 0.3 bln in 2015 
Funding 
Allocation 
Federal Agencies with R&D over 
$100 mln allocates 2.8% of budget 
7% of the total H2020 budget 
Application 
Process 
Strictly to Phase 1 until 2012; since 
2012 to Ph1 or Ph2 
Project to any of the phases, then 
selection 
Success rate 17% for Ph1, 40% go on to Ph2 8.2% for Ph1 and 5.9% for Ph27 
Types of Projects Defined by departments Bottom-up with note of H2020 goals 
Sources: European Commission, 2014; SBIR.gov, 2016a 
2.3.2 SBIR and the SME Instrument 
SME Instrument seems to account for the changes made within SBIR. Small firms 
applying for funding may do so alone or jointly with other organisations; receiving 
funding in Phase 1 is not a prerequisite for applying to Phase 2 funding; and trackable 
commercial impact is seen as the highest of anticipated result of the SMEI award. Yet, 
while SBIR funding is directed more at academic entrepreneurship and includes broader 
goals to incentivise entrepreneurial behavior, including that of minority groups, the SMEI 
is much more focused on delivering commercialisable innovations. A new product or 
service is not a prerequisite of SBIR, where the Phase 2 funding needs to be spent on 
R&D. In contrast, the SME Instrument specifies exactly what types of activities its Phase 
2 are fundable. Potentially, this should improve the results of the programme in terms of 
innovations that actually make it to the market, which is where some parts of SBIR are 
reported to be weak (Archibald and Finifter, 2003).  
The design of the SME Instrument includes and builds on non-commercial benefits that 
analysts identified for the SBIR programme over the course of its running. These are 
                                                 
7 This data is based on calculations presented in Section 2.3 and thus may differ from other reported results.   
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certification effect, demonstration effect and strategy effect. Additionally, we argue, the 
design of the SME Instrument expands on these envisioned effects to include the open 
innovation effect.  
Lerner (1999) found that despite SBIR awardees demonstrated significantly higher 
growth over 10 years than matched firms, the size of the award had no effect on the rates 
of growth. From this finding, he suggested a certification effect of SBIR award: being 
recognised as a potential high growth firm by SBIR was a signal of credibility for private 
investors. In the circumstances where there is uncertainty regarding innovative SMEs, 
SBIR awards reduced this uncertainty by marking investable companies to private 
venture capitalists. Similarly, the recognition of companies with high growth potential 
has been one of the main goals of the SME Instrument.  
Other studies (Audretsch et al., 2002b; Cooper, 2003) report that scientists and engineers 
who were awarded by SBIR to start develop their innovative technology projects tended 
to inspire others in their environment to apply for SBIR funding. This demonstration 
effect results in high clustering of successful SBIR awardees in certain regions and 
organisations.  
Finally, SBIR awards tended to alter subsequent strategies of awardee firms. For 
instance, Cooper (2003) reports that SBIR awardees tend to engage in more radical 
projects or move to emerging technological areas.  
The SME Instrument is not explicitly targeting the latter two effects to occur in Europe, 
although they would definitely be beneficial externalities. What the SMEI design is 
making emphasis on is the value of collaboration, communication and networking 
through its coaching programme and the work of national contact points that organise 
events and provide support for all SMEs that applied for funding, not just successful 
applicants. This emphasis bodes well with the broader European policy goals towards 
greater cohesion and collaboration. However, the precise scale of the effect remains to be 
investigated.  
Yet, the changes in the SBIR programme, such as the introduction of STTR and the 
opportunity to apply for Phase 2 funding without having previously received Phase 1 
funding, have not addressed some of the criticisms that researchers expressed over it, and 
the SME Instrument may suffer from the same ailments. Primarily, these are the 
weakness of the Phase 3 and the regional inequality (Link and Scott, 2010). 
The main reason of why SBIR-awarded projects drop out after Phase 2 is the lack of 
funding allocated, and the discontinuation of funding in Phase 3. After advanced stages 
of piloting and testing, companies have to rely to a large extent on the certification effect 
that the status of an awardee provides. The scope of activities and support offered in 
Phase 3 of SBIR varies greatly depending on the Federal Agency executing the project, 
and is a subject of ongoing criticism. Yet, it still seems to be stronger and better defined 
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than Phase 3 of the SME Instrument, which only contains the general guidance for the 
awardees to seek further European financing options, but offers little practical guidance.  
In addition, there are certain regional disparities in terms of regional distribution of SBIR 
awards and subsequent trajectories of awardee firms. SBIR project evaluation does not 
consider the location of the applicant company, which is why the distribution of awardees 
spans all US states. It provides beneficial effects (demonstration effect) in regions with 
weak venture capital infrastructure, as other sources of funding for SMEs are limited 
(Cooper, 2003). Yet, the awardees that demonstrate the highest subsequent growth are 
mostly located in clusters with highly developed venture capital infrastructure that can 
provide next stage investment for SBIR-marked firms (Lerner, 1999).  
This heterogeneous impact on different regions will most likely be replicated in return on 
investment in the SME Instrument. In Section 3 of this article, we identify countries like 
Italy and Spain among the sources of applications for the SME Instrument funding. This 
may be likely due to the lack of national and regional support tools than in richer 
European countries. However, learning from SBIR results, the impact of SME Instrument 
may be vastly different on SME growth in these countries than on growth trajectories of 
awardees from Germany or France. 
3 SME Instrument: Initial Results and descriptive statistics of proposals’ success rate 
In this section, we will provide descriptive statistics of the first results achieved by the 
SME Instrument since 2014, presenting aggregated calculations that are our elaborations 
from EASME data website8. This study includes all the data since the launch of the SME 
Instrument. The second part of the section presents some initial considerations on funding 
inefficiencies within SMEI.  
3.1 SMEI Descriptive Statistics 
As cited above, the calls for the SME Instrument are open continuously, and every three 
months, following the so-called cut-off dates, rankings are published. In 2014 there were 
three cut-offs of Phase 1, and two of Phase 2. The year 2015 counts 4 cut-offs per each 
phase, and 2016 counts two cut-offs for each phase up to the moment of writing. 
Since the first launch of Horizon 2020, the SME Instrument has been extremely popular 
with small and medium companies. At the end of May 2016, SMEs counted for the 
27.41% of all projects submitted to H2020 and received 23.76% of the EU budget 
contribution. 24,631 proposals have been submitted for the SME Instrument, respectively 
18,372 proposals by 19,895 companies to Phase 1 and 6,259 proposals by 8,209 
companies to Phase 2.  
Only a small fraction of these applicants was awarded SMEI funding (see Table 4). Out 
of all the winners of the 3-years period (2014-2016), 99 companies were awarded both a 
                                                 
8 See https://ec.europa.eu/easme/en 
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Phase 1 and a Phase 2 grants of, respectively, € 4.95 mln and € 161.12 mln, meaning a 
total EU contribution of € 166.07 mln invested in these European SME champions. 
Table 4 SMEI Awards, 2014-16 
 Projects Companies Total Award 
Phase 1 1,506 1,632 € 75.3 mln 
Phase 2 372 466 € 619.6 mln 
Source: authors’ calculations based on EASME data 
Figure 3 depicts the breakdown of proposals submitted to the SMEI according to their 
theme. The most popular topic receiving the majority of proposals is ICT under the call 
“Open Disruptive Innovation Scheme (implemented through the SME instrument)”: in 
2014-2015, it received 29% (5,504) of the total number of proposals to the SME 
Instrument. The Energy topic is in the second place: the call “Stimulating the innovation 
potential of SMEs for a low carbon and efficient energy system” received 12% (2,252) of 
proposals submitted. Nanotechnologies and advanced materials gained the third place 
with the call “Accelerating the uptake of nanotechnologies, advanced materials or 
advanced manufacturing and processing technologies by SMEs”, which received 11% 
(2,133) proposals. These topics correspond with technology areas with some of the most 
eagerly anticipated results, which can help tackle H2020 Societal Challenges.  
Figure 3 Submitted Proposals per Topic (2014-2015) 
 
Source: authors’ calculations based on EASME data 
The labels and the themes of the call for applications of the SMEI shifted in the work 
programmes 2016-2017, but the contents of the calls and the ranking of the most popular 
topics changed only slightly (see Figure 4). ICT remained in the first place, counting 23% 
(1,261) of the total of 5,428 proposals submitted in 2016. The same can be said for 
Energy and low carbon issues, ranking again second place with 11% (577) submitted 
proposals. The third place of the ranking is held by the Health and Wellbeing topic, with 
the call “Accelerating market introduction of ICT solutions for Health, Well-Being and 
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Ageing Well”, with 10% (538) submitted proposals. 
Figure 4 Submitted Proposals per Topic (2016) 
 
Source: authors’ calculations based on EASME data 
We now turn to geographical distribution of SMEI applicants and awardees. Italy is the 
most generous Member State in term of number of proposals (see Figure 5): it ranks the 
first place with a total of 5,336 proposals, 4,036 in Phase 1 and 1,300 in Phase 2. Italy is 
followed by Spain and UK, respectively with 4,124 and 2,651 proposals (3.089 and 1.714 
in Phase 1; 1.035 and 937 in Phase 2). 
Figure 5 Top 15 Countries with the Highest Number of Submitted Proposals (2014-2016) 
 
Source: authors’ calculations based on EASME data 
The three countries keep the podium even considering the participation in winning 
proposals, but with a different ranking. In Phase 1 (see Figure 6), Spain achieved the first 
place with 319 companies participating in funded proposals, followed by Italy with 280 
companies, and UK with 213 companies. Germany ranks fourth place with a significant 
drop, counting only 109 SMEs participating in funded proposals. 
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Figure 6 Participation in Funded Proposals per Country, Phase 1 (2014-2016) 
 
Source: authors’ calculations based on EASME data 
In Phase 2 (see Figure 7) Spain keeps the first place with 81 winning companies, 
followed by Italy with 62 companies and the UK with 54 companies. The gap between 
the top three countries and the follow-up group is smaller than in Phase 1, and Germany 
ranks the fourth place with 43 SMEs participating in funded proposals. 
Figure 7 Participation in Funded Proposals per Country, Phase 2 (2014-2016) 
 
Source: authors’ calculations based on EASME data 
Comparing the position of the member states in the rankings based on the number of 
SMEs participating in submitted proposals and the number of companies participating in 
funded proposals, we notice that there are many countries with low proposal submission 
rate, but high proposal success rate. For example, Ireland counts 410 companies 
submitting proposals (266 in Phase 1 and 144 in Phase 2). In terms of succeeding 
proposals, Ireland counts 38 funded SMEs in Phase 1 and 16 in Phase 2, for 38 projects 
in Phase 1 and 13 in Phase 2. This means that, in 2014/2016, Ireland received € 1.9 mln 
of EU Contribution in the Phase 1 and € 25.8 mln in Phase 2 (see Figure 8). Irish results 
in term of budget gained under the SMEI program are significant if compared with other 
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countries. 
Figure 8 Top 15 Countries per EU Contribution per Phase (2014-2016) 
 
Source: authors’ calculations based on EASME data 
In 2014-2015, the SMEI budget allocated, combining the budgets of Societal Challenges 
and LEITs, accounted for 5.30% (€ 519.9 mln) of the total H2020 annual budget, and it is 
due to increase up to 7.53% (€ 790.9 mln) in 2016-2017.  
The best performer country in terms of budget gained from the SMEI is Spain, which 
received € 114.33 mln in total, respectively € 15.25 mln in Phase 1 and € 99.08 mln in 
Phase 2. The United Kingdom ranks second, with a total EU contribution of € 104.93 mln 
(€ 9.85 mln in Phase 1; € 95.08 mln in Phase 2). The third is Italy, with € 73.81 mln of 
EU contribution (€ 11.85 mln in Phase 1; € 61.96 mln in Phase 2). 
Figure 9 Dimensions of Applicant and Funded SMEs (2014-2015) 
Source: EASME 2016 
We also compare characteristics of applicant and funded SMEs in 2014-2015 (see Figure 
9).  While there are no strong differences in the demographic, turnover or age of 
companies that tend to receive the award from the overall applicant population, there are 
certain groups that stand out. For instance, successful companies tend to be micro-sized 
(1-3 employees), representing more than half of the sample both in Phase 1 and Phase 2, 
and at least 4 years old, as are the companies with a turnover range of € 100,000 - € 1 
mln.  
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3.2 High numbers of promising proposals: the European neglected talents 
Finally, we examine proposals submitted to Phase 2 of the SMEI that did not succeed in 
receiving contributions from the European Commission more closely. A two dimensional 
matrix is proposed (see Figure 10). The first dimension considers whether the proposal 
was awarded funding in the Phase 1 of the SMEI; the second dimension considers 
whether the proposal applying in Phase 2 was or not judged above threshold but not 
funded for lack of available funds.  
The shares of proposals that transitioned from SMEI Phase 1 to Phase 2, and the share of 
proposals funded in Phase 2, have multiple implications.  
Most importantly, we identify the European ‘neglected talent’: the 377 proposals that 
scored above threshold in Phase 2 applications, but did not receive funding. Using the 
criterion of whether these proposals were supported in Phase 1, we classify them as 
‘spontaneous, but neglected talent’ (not funded in Ph1, 116 proposals), and as ‘at first 
supported, and then neglected talent’ (funded in Ph1, 261 proposals).  
The common characteristic of both groups is that these proposals scored highly in the 
assessment and were judged as potentially highly innovative. The neglected talent 
represents potential growth and investments for proposing SMEs, innovation and new job 
opportunities that should not be discarded solely due to the lack of funds. Not supporting 
these projects is the SME Instrument’s main shortcoming. We stress that the ‘neglected 
talent’ issue, as much as it is tackled now with the ‘Seal of Excellence’ initiative, should 
be tackled much more.  
Figure 10 European Wasted Talent Matrix (2014-2016) 
 
Source: authors’ calculations based on EASME data 
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The ‘at first supported’ neglected talent is a case that has more tangible financial 
implications. These proposals already received a total of € 13.05 mln of European 
contribution in Phase 1 and were judged positively during evaluation in Phase 2. These 
proposals requested a total of € 456 mln from the European commission.  
The budget requested represents more than 65% of the total budget allocated through the 
SMEI, in both Phase 1 and 2 (€ 695 mln, 2014/2015). This category of projects received 
the Seal of Excellence since they were judged above the threshold needed for receiving 
funding, being of high quality, but below the budget available for funds.  
SMEs awarded a Phase 1 have a triple chance of being awarded a Phase 2 and, in general, 
achieve better results in Phase 2 evaluation than SMEs that submit a proposal directly to 
Phase 2 (see fig. 11). Only 10% of companies that participate in Phase 2 can boast a 
Phase 1 award. The majority of these ongoing applicants (76%) receive a positive 
evaluation in Phase 2, being judged above threshold, and 14% are funded with a Phase 2 
grant.  
 
 
Fig. 11 Does starting from Phase 1 help in Phase 2? (2014-2015) 
 
Source: Lai (2015), The SME Instrument H2020, EASME (2015) 
An issue of a different nature is represented by proposals that received Phase 1 SMEI 
funding, but failed to score sufficiently to be funded in Phase 2. These 184 proposals are 
identified as ‘missed opportunities’. A total of € 9.2 mln was invested in these proposals 
in Phase 1 funding stage. The participating companies therefore missed the opportunity to 
receive further EU investment by submitting inadequate Phase 2 proposals.  
We might suggest multiple reasons for that, ranging from the mismanagement of EU 
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funds by awardees or the development of inappropriate business models and/or strategy, 
to the emergence of unforeseen hurdles in technology. While any policy can expect some 
share of failed investment, further research is required in order to investigate whether 
Phase 1 selection process could identify the selection failure and avoid failed funding. An 
investigation into reasons of this failed Phase 2 applications would benefit the appraisal 
of the Instrument as well.   
Finally, the bottom left box identifies proposals that without obtaining any funds in Ph1 
applied to Ph2 and were judged below threshold. Most probably, companies in this 
category should apply to Phase 1 before trying again with submitting a proposal directly 
to Phase 2.   
4 Policy Implications 
Based on these first few years of application of SMEI we can identify three main policy 
implications. 
Popular but too competitive. The first implication is a direct consequence of the 
numbers discussed above. The number of applicants for the Instrument has been beyond 
expectations. Many of the companies applying for SMEI were approaching EU funding 
for the first time. This reflects the fact that some of the characteristics of the tool are 
extremely appreciated by SMEs. Bottom-up funding scheme, simple application process, 
time to grant (both for Phase 1 and Phase 2), the lump sum contribution and other 
friendly features of the SMEI make it appealing for small firms. In addition, the general 
availability of contribution and the broad criteria used by the European Commission for 
the calls of the SMEI are among the elements attracting many companies.  
The bottom up approach leaves SMEs lot of freedom in determining the scope of their 
projects and wide possibilities in designing their budget. All these elements made SMEI 
one of the most popular innovation support tools across Framework Programmes. 
Still, given the fact that the amount of budget had been set in advance, such popularity 
made SMEI extremely competitive. The competition is so high that it might discourage 
some of the prospective applicants from spending time preparing applications with little 
chance of success. Due to lack of funding, way too many good applications, after 
receiving initial funding in Phase 1, did not receive funding in Phase 2.  
Could SMEI be a larger programme? Balancing resource allocation within framework 
programmes is not an easy task and increasing the budget of a programme leads to cuts 
elsewhere. Still, the staggering number of solid applications should be something 
legislators keep in mind when designing new policy interventions. In addition, the level 
of popularity of SMEI should lead to more concrete attempts of creating synergies with 
national and regional levels of intervention. The kick off of the Seal of Excellence is a 
starting point. However, more courageous and direct steps to connect the SMEI pipeline 
of applications to national and regional innovation support scheme could be attempted. 
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SMEI Storytelling. As we observe SMEI awardees develop their business plans, we 
encounter various examples of technology transfer, business model innovation, open 
innovation, and diversification. We need to closely monitor these cases, and learn from 
successes and failures.  
Early anecdotal evidence seems to suggest that EU SMEs are crossing the “valley of 
death” in many different ways. There is not one model, i.e. exponential growth and IPO, 
but many forms of growth. SMEI allows, for example, academic spin-off companies to 
disenfranchise from purely research-oriented environment. At the same time, larger 
SMEs use SMEI to differentiate and explore areas of business that might lead to future 
sources of competitive advantage. Alternatively, we see start-ups developing new 
business models from scratch hoping to become the next unicorns.  
In all these cases, the pathways of growth are very different. While it is likely that for 
some companies access to risk finance will be fundamental for future growth, others 
might rely on internal support, through reinvestment of early profits. Policy makers 
should monitor how these groups of companies evolve as they might indeed reveal 
unique way to markets that had been previously ignored or belittled. 
Phase 3: one last shot. SMEI was designed as a 3 phases support mechanism. Still, 
Phase 3 remains not very clearly defined and not directly funded. “Synergies with other 
programs” are often cited as the expected dynamics that will take place in Phase 3. We 
suggest that as results and success stories emerge, the Commission as well as other policy 
makers could take a bolder approach towards Phase 3, and indicate new forms of support 
to companies that successfully proved to have innovative projects, and that are wisely 
spending EU money.  
Legislators could indeed support with new mechanisms what often been cited as the EU 
Innovator’s Champions League. Access to risk finance, but also demand side innovation 
policy, smart procurement and more could be tools for direct support of these companies. 
These companies should be the ones that will lay the foundations for the new competitive 
advantage of Europe. 
5 Future Research 
This paper lists multiple possible avenues for further research. In the context of theory, 
companies that won SME Instrument awards present a unique cross-European sample of 
potentially fast-growing firms. This sample can be regarded as a ‘treated sample’ and be 
matched with other firms for analysis. As the number of SMEI recipients continues to 
increase, their growth trajectories will diverge. Analysing these growth trajectories and 
their factors will highlight conditions of growth opportunities in Europe.  
In the context of policy evaluation, SME Instrument is an experiment in the European 
policy landscape, and its successes are yet to be assessed. In this work, we suggest some 
of the conceptual policy lessons that can already be derived from the initial analysis of 
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results of the SME Instrument: the award is very thinly spread. It attracts unequal 
numbers of applications from the member states, and the projects are funded unequally as 
well. Finally, there is inefficiency in funding, which causes the ‘neglect’ of talent.  
In addition, SMEI as a ‘treated sample’ present an opportunity for the study of 
additionality. Usually, evaluating the additionality effect of policy requires having a 
matching sample of companies. However, in the absence of a randomised group, the 
matching sample always contains bias that is hard to overcome (Bakhshi et al., 2015; 
Bronzini and Piselli, 2016; Van Cauwenberge et al., 2013). The projects in the SME 
Instrument are selected based on their merit, but the merit of a project is defined by a 
capability of a firm that designs it. SMEI awardees may simply be better than other SMEs 
and would have fared better than matching firms anyway. In the case of the SME 
Instrument, this can be addressed by using the Seal of Excellence awardees – companies 
that scored enough points to be funded but were not due to the lack of funds – as a 
matching group of companies. These companies constitute the possible sample of 
matching companies, which can help to evaluate the impact of the SME Instrument.  
To sum up, as a way of the future research agenda, we suggest exploration of the 
following questions: 
 What are the policy learning options between SBIR and SME Instrument? 
 What are the certification, demonstration and strategy effects of the SME 
Instrument? Does it have open innovation effect? 
 A comparative analysis of growth rates, technological trajectories, and 
commercial success of firms that became SBIR and SMEI awardees to highlight 
favouring and inhibiting factors that could inform innovation policy in both the 
USA and the EU.  
 What are the survival rates and growth trajectories of SMEI awardees? 
 Do the companies that are recognised by SMEI funding and the Seal of 
Excellence demonstrate gazelles growth rates, i.e. does the SMEI identify 
European Champions? 
 Does the SMEI achieve its main stated goals? Does the SMEI have additionality 
effect? 
 How can the design of the SMEI be improved? 
 What are the externalities of SME in terms of environmental and social impact, 
regional development, and entrepreneurial culture? 
 What are the horizontal and vertical synergies that the SMEI demonstrates with (i) 
other European policies; and (ii) with national and regional entrepreneurship and 
innovation policies? 
 How efficient is the SME Instrument as a separate policy instrument in 
comparison with alternative options of EU Framework Programme funding 
allocation options? 
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6 Conclusions 
This article, to the knowledge of its authors, is the first contribution that focuses on the 
SME Instrument and research prospects it offers. As a unique policy, first of its kind ever 
adopted in Europe, the SME Instrument was eagerly expected in European business 
research and policy communities. In this work, we demonstrated that indeed it received 
extraordinary rate of response from European small firms. However, in reality, the surge 
of applications for the SMEI support could not be met within the H2020 budgets, which 
has led to issues, such as neglected talent, and the loss of investment.  
These observations entail multiple lessons that the European Commission and other 
policymakers should learn in the future iterations of their programmes, as well as tangible 
research agendas that need to be captured by academic researchers. Ultimately, European 
decision makers need to recognise that in a heterogeneous environment they operate in, 
there are different avenues for growth, and adopted policies need to be flexible enough to 
accommodate these variations.  
At this point, including the SME Instrument as a permanent part of the European 
Commission’s portfolio in its current form would be questionable. With the global shift 
of policy support from established industries to small and medium enterprises, we 
suggest that Europe should keep looking for optimal ways to support its SMEs, 
positioning them as the main drivers of growth, but also should allocate financial support 
in a smarter way within a better working model than the current SME Instrument.  
We place significant expectations on the academic community to take up the task of 
appraisal and evaluation of results of the SME Instrument. In this work, we briefly 
overviewed its most successful counterpart, the US SBIR programme. Yet, there is 
evidence worldwide on ineffective and cost-inefficient measures of SME support tools, 
which demonstrate unsuccessful or unimpactful interventions (Buckley, 2016; Parker, 
2000). We believe that ultimately, the effectiveness of the SME Instrument will be 
decisive in the ways it is gradually improved.  
Subsequent Framework Programmes will undoubtedly keep experimenting with new 
tools that offer support to European innovative small and medium enterprises. At the time 
of writing, H2020 is starting its mid-term evaluation, and preparations are underway for 
the development of the EU Innovation Council. With all its shortcomings listed in this 
paper, the general frame of the SME Instrument may become a suitable playground for 
piloting these tools. The lessons learned from the SME Instrument will also be accounted 
for in the 9th Framework Programme.  
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